




FEDERAL FUNCTIONS: EXECUTION OF POWERS THE CONSTITUTION 
GRANTS TO PERSONS AND ENTITIES OUTSIDE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
by Robert G. Natelson* 
ABSTRACT 
The Constitution grants enumerated powers to officers and agencies of the federal government. 
What is less widely understood is that it also grants extensive powers to persons and entities 
entirely outside the federal government. The courts refer to the exercise of those powers as 
“federal functions.” 
 This short Essay is the first unified survey of those federal functions. It classifies them and 
identifies certain commonalities and differences. 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the Constitution consists of enumerated powers.  Perhaps the 
best-known enumeration is the extensive list of powers granted to Congress in 
Article I, Section 8.
1
  Shorter lists appear in Article II (granting authority to the 
president)
2
 and Article III (granting authority to the judiciary).
3
  In addition, 
the Constitution grants a few powers to the United States government as an 
entity.
4
  When officers and agencies of, and contractors with, the federal 
 
 *  Professor of Law (ret.), The University of Montana; Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 
the Independence Institute, Denver. The author acknowledges the assistance of Jacob Meckler, 
George Mason School of Law, Class of 2022, and Rita Dunaway, J.D. Washington and Lee 
University, Class of 2001. 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
2 Id. art. II, §§ 2–3; see Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s “Executive 
Vesting Clause”—Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 35 
(2009) (finding that the frequent claim that the first clause of the Constitution is a grant of “Executive 
Power” and that Sections 2 and 3 merely clarify its scope is inconsistent with the drafting practice 
applied to the Eighteenth Century power-granting institutions). 
3 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
4 See Robert G. Natelson, More News on the Powers Reserved Exclusively to the States, 20 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 92, 95–96 (2019) (discussing grants to the government in Articles IV and 
VI of the Constitution).  
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government execute these powers those actors are exercising federal 
functions.5 
In addition, many of the Constitution’s provisions bestow authority on 
persons or entities that are neither part of, nor contractors with, the federal 
government.  The usual course of business of many of these actors is to carry 
out duties unrelated to the Constitution.  For example, state governors, 
legislatures, and governments normally operate under their state constitutions.  
However, the Constitution gives them federal responsibilities as well.  
Similarly, Congress, which normally serves as the federal legislature, also 
receives specific authority from the Constitution’s provisions for amendment.
6
  
Congress exercises its amendment authority as an independent assembly 
representing the people directly, rather than as the federal legislature.
7
 
The Constitution grants other powers to persons and entities not part of 
any government at all.  These grantees include conventions for proposing and 
ratifying constitutional amendments, presidential electors, jurors, and federal 
election voters.  The courts likewise characterize these non-federal persons 
and entities as exercising federal functions. 
To date, there has been no scholarly literature addressing the general 
classes of federal functions exercised by non-federal actors or their 
commonalties and differences.  Instead, scholarly attention has been focused 
on particular institutions, such as the Electoral College
8
 and the conventions 
and legislatures acting in the amendment process.
9
  This Essay is designed to 
 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Bedford, 914 F.3d 422, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that an employee 
of a U.S. government contractor performs a federal function); see also Commodities Exp. Co. v. 
Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. 695 F.3d 518, 529 (6th Cir. 2012) (referring to “federal agencies that perform 
federal functions”). 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 7 See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 8 See Christopher Anglim, A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the Electoral College: Its Creation, 
History, and Prospects for Reform, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 297, 297–99 (1993) (focusing on the presidential 
selection process regarding the Electoral College, rather than examining the “federal function” 
aspects). 
 9 See ROBERT G. NATELSON, THE LAW OF ARTICLE V: STATE INITIATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS 56 (2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter NATELSON, LAW OF ARTICLE V] (highlighting the 
convention call in the amendment process); see also Robert G. Natelson, Is the Constitution’s 
Convention for Proposing Amendments a “Mystery”? Overlooked Evidence in the Narrative of 
Uncertainty, 104 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2020) [hereinafter Natelson, Mystery] 
(explaining how the “convention of states” applies to the Constitution); Robert G. Natelson, 
Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 
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fill the gap and in part to provoke more examination.  It draws partly on my 
previous research into the Elections Clause,
10
 the amendment process,
11
 and 
the presidential election system.
12
 
I.  CLASSIFICATION OF FEDERAL FUNCTIONS 
The Supreme Court first applied the term “federal function” to the actions 
of a non-federal entity in the 1922 case of Leser v. Garnett.13  Justice Louis 
Brandeis wrote the opinion of the Court.  Justice Brandeis found that a state 
legislature’s power to ratify a constitutional amendment derived directly from 
the Constitution rather than from any reserved state authority and that the 
ratification procedure was governed wholly by Article V and could not be 
altered by state constitutions or laws.
14
  Since that decision, courts at all levels 
have applied the term “federal function” to the execution of constitutional 
powers by non-federal actors. 
In 2015 the Court decided Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission.15  That case grouped many of these 
federal functions into classes. The Court defined the classes as electoral, 
 
Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615, 629 (2013) [hereinafter Natelson, Conventions] (discussing 
convention terminology); Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by 
Convention: Rules Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 696 (2011) [hereinafter Natelson, 
Rules] (focusing on convention calls and the roles of legislatures within the convention process). 
 10 See generally Robert G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate 
Elections, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Natelson, Original Scope] (examining the 
intended scope of Congress’s enumerated power to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections”). In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 
Chief Justice Roberts cited to that article for the proposition that Anti-Federalists supported vesting 
election regulation power solely in state legislatures. 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2684 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).    
 11 Id. 
 12 See Rob Natelson, Presidential Elector Discretion: The Originalist Evidence, ORIGINALISM BLOG 
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2018/01/president-elector-
discretion-the-originalist-evidence-part-2rob-natelson.html [hereinafter Natelson, Discretion] 
(highlighting the process of choosing a president); Rob Natelson, Elector Discretion: A Response to 
John Vlahoplus, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Apr. 4, 2020), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-
originalism-blog/2020/04/elector-discretion-a-response-to-john-vlahoplusrob-natelson.html 
(responding to John Vlahoplus’s Bound Electors).  But see John Vlahoplus, Bound Electors, 106 
VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 9 (2020) (claiming that electors may be bound).  
 13 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Ariz. St. Legis., 135 S. Ct. at 2652. 
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ratifying, legislative, appointive, and consenting.16  This Essay employs those 
designations. It further identifies three additional classes: administrative, 
proposing, and judicial. 
A. Electoral Functions 
The Constitution grants certain non-federal actors power to participate in 
federal elections.
17
  Although presidential electors are not officers of the federal 
government,
18
 when they vote for president and vice president
19
 they “exercise 
federal functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of authority conferred 
by, the Constitution of the United States.”
20
  Similarly, the Constitution 
empowers the states to choose presidential electors in the manner their 
legislatures direct.
21
  It designates as congressional “Electors” those people who 
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of 
their respective state legislatures.
22
  Congressional electors derive their power 
from the Constitution and exercise a federal electoral function when they cast 
their ballots.
23
  Before ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment,
24
 state 





 16 Id. at 2667–68 (distinguishing electoral, appointive, consenting, ratifying, and legislative functions). 
 17 Id. at 2667 (describing the authority to select United States Senators granted to state legislatures by 
Article 1, Section 3 prior to the enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment). 
 18 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934) (highlighting that “presidential electors are not 
officers or agents of the federal government (citing In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890)).  
 19 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 20 Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545. 
 21 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25, 34-35 (1892) (observing that 
the Constitution grants state legislatures “plenary authority to direct the manner of appointment” of 
presidential electors for their states and that state legislatures may appoint electors directly); see also 
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020) (holding that “a State may . . . penalize an 
elector for breaking his pledge and voting for someone other than the presidential candidate who 
won his State’s popular vote.”). 
 22 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (election of Representatives); id. amend. XVII, cl. 1 (election of 
Senators). 
 23 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1884) (stating that the Constitution grants the function 
of casting a vote for members of Congress). 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 25 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
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B. Appointive Functions 
Before ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, governors enjoyed 
direct authority to make vacancy appointments to the Senate.
26
  Under the 
Seventeenth Amendment, governors still make vacancy appointments to the 
Senate if authorized by their respective state legislatures.
27
  Under Article V, 
Congress exercises an appointive function when it determines whether state 




C. Proposing and Ratifying Functions 
The Constitution grants Congress power to propose amendments.
29
  When 
Congress acts in the amendment process, it does so as an independent body 
representing the people rather than as the federal legislature.
30
  The document 
further grants authority to state legislatures make “Application” to Congress to 
call a “Convention for proposing Amendments,” and when two thirds of the 
states apply, issuing the call is mandatory.
31
  The state legislatures’ ability to 
compel Congress to act is, therefore, a branch of the proposal power—
although authority to issue final proposed amendments rests with the 
 
 26 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. 
 27 Id. amend. XVII, cl. 2.  The Supreme Court labeled this an “appointive function” in Arizona State 
Legis.  135 S. Ct. at 2668 n.17. 
 28 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
29 Id. 
30 See In re Op. of the Justs., 107 A. 673, 674 (Me. 1919) (“Nor is Congress, in proposing constitutional 
amendments, strictly speaking, acting in the exercise of ordinary legislative power.  It is acting in 
behalf of and as the representative of the people of the United States under the power expressly 
conferred by Article V.”); see also Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1127–28 (D. Idaho 1981) 
(stating that when acting in the amendment process Congress is not acting pursuant to its Article I 
legislative powers), vacated as moot, Carmen v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982); see also Hollingsworth 
v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 381 (1798) (holding the congressional proposal of an amendment is not part 
of the legislative process, so presentment to the president is unnecessary). 
31 U.S. CONST. art. V (“[O]n the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, 
[Congress] shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments[.]”).  Although the Constitution calls 
this gathering a “Convention for proposing Amendments,” in recent years it has become common to 
refer to it as a “constitutional convention.”  This misnomer is deceptive, because Article V grants the 
convention only power to “propose Amendments to this Constitution,” not power to write a new one.  
Id. (emphasis added).  The convention for proposing amendments is one of three kinds of 
conventions the Constitution authorizes.  The others were established to ratify or reject the 
Constitution itself, id. art. VII, and to ratify or reject proposed amendments, id. art. V. 
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  The Constitution also empowers state legislatures and state 




D. Administrative Functions 
The Constitution assigns to Congress the administrative functions of (1) 
calling a convention for proposing amendments when required by two thirds 
of the states
34
 and (2) counting electoral votes in presidential elections.
35
  Other 
administrative functions include a state governor’s authority to issue writs of 
election to fill vacancies in the House of Representatives
36
 and like authority to 
issue writs of election to fill vacancies in the Senate.
37
 
E. Legislative Functions 
The Elections Clause
38
 grants authority to “the Legislature” of each state to 
regulate the times, places, and manner of congressional elections.
39
  However, 
the grant is not to state legislatures alone, but to the entire legislative apparatus 
of each state.  This apparatus encompasses, where applicable, initiative and 
 
32 See U.S. CONST. art. V. (providing that Congress or a “Convention for proposing Amendments” 
rather than the state legislatures, shall propose amendments). 
33 See Arizona State Legis., 576 U.S. at 806 (contrasting the ratifying function, exercisable exclusively 
by state legislatures, with the “ordinary business of legislation”). 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. V.  The normal scope of this kind of convention call is quite narrow, designating 
merely time, place, and subject for meeting.  NATELSON, LAW OF ARTICLE V, supra note 9, at 55–
57. 
35
  U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 36 Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 37 Id. amend. XVII, cl. 2. 
 38 Id. art. I, § 4, cl 1.  Although the Supreme Court refers to this as the Elections Clause, a more accurate 
title is Times, Places and Manner Clause, a term adopted by several commentators.  See, e.g., Robert 
E. Ross & Barrett Anderson, Single-Member Districts Are Not Constitutionally Required, 33 CONST. 
COMMENT. 261, 263 (2018); Natelson, Original Scope, supra note 10, at 1; Paul E. McGreal, 
Unconstitutional Politics, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519, 553 (2001).  The term “Times, Places, and 
Manner Clause” is preferable to distinguish it from other “elections clauses” scattered throughout the 
Constitution.  See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (describing the election of Representatives); id. art. 
II, § 1 (describing the election of the President); id. amend. XII (revising portions of Article II, 
Section I describing the election of the President); id. amend. XVII, cl. 1 (describing the election of 
Senators). 
 39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 cl. 1; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) 
(characterizing the Elections Clause as an “express delegation[] of power to the States to act with 
respect to federal elections”). 
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 and signature by the governor.
41
  The Constitution 
also grants (subject to some exceptions) lawmaking authority to state 
legislatures to regulate state choice of presidential electors.
42
 
F. Consenting Functions. 
In Arizona State Legislature, the Supreme Court referred to the power of 
a state legislature to agree to acquisition of federal enclaves within state 
boundaries as a consenting function.
43
  In this instance, however, the grant is 
to the state legislature alone, exclusive of other state actors.
44
  Arizona State 
 
 40 See Arizona State Legis., 576 U.S. at 808 (holding that a state may, by voter initiative, vest power to 
draw congressional districts in an independent commission); see also Ohio ex rel. Davis v. 
Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569–70 (1916) (holding that state regulations under the Elections Clause 
are subject to referendum if mandated by the state constitution). 
 41 See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) (reasoning that Elections Clause regulations require 
the governor’s signature because “these requirements would be nugatory if they did not have 
appropriate sanctions in the definition of offenses and punishments”).  The Supreme Court has not 
relied on originalist sources for its conclusion that the grant in the Elections Clause is to the entire 
state legislative apparatus rather than to the legislature as a free-standing assembly.  However, such 
sources seem to support the Court’s conclusion.  Before the Constitution was ratified, American 
states typically regulated election by statute rather than by mere legislative resolution.  Natelson, supra 
note 10, at 13–17.  This practice continued for congressional elections immediately after ratification.  
Id. at 17. 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 cl. 2.  Although the Constitution explicitly lodges regulation of the choice of 
presidential electors in the states, id., the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress also has 
authority to regulate presidential elections.  Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544 (1934). 
However, the source of that authority, aside from Congress’s authority to designate the time for 
choosing electors and the day in which they vote, US. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 4, is unclear.  Justice 
George Sutherland’s opinion for the Court in Burroughs relied on Ex parte Yarbrough.  Burroughs, 
290 U.S. at 545–46.  However, Yarbrough held only that the Elections Clause granted Congress 
implied power over congressional elections.  110 U.S. 651, 656–57 (1884) (reciting the terms of the 
indictments at issue); see also id. at 660 (relying on Article I, Section Four of the Constitution for its 
holding).  
 
  Despite efforts to classify Justice Sutherland as a judicial conservative, Alpheus Thomas Mason, The 
Conservative World of Mr. Justice Sutherland, 1883 – 1918, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 443, 471 (1938), 
he could be quite freewheeling about locating sources of federal power.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1936) (finding, despite the wording of the Tenth 
Amendment, that the federal government has inherent sovereign authority not enumerated in the 
Constitution). 
 43 Arizona State Legis., 135 S. Ct. at 2667. 
44
  In McPherson, supra note 21, the court stated that the Constitution’s specification that the legislature 
was to be the agency directing the manner of appointing presidential electors prevented a state from 
circumscribing the legislature’s power. Id. at 25. The court added that “This power is conferred upon 
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Legislature similarly denominated the legislative consent of existing states to 
creation of new states consisting of lands in existing states.
45
  Still another such 
function is the consent to federal action by state legislatures or executives 
under the Guarantee Clause.
46
 
It is not entirely clear if the Constitution bestows the power to consent to 
enclaves or creation of new states on the legislature acting independently (as 
in Article V) or on the entire state legislative apparatus (as in the Elections 
Clause).  Intuitively, however, it would seem that action effectively modifying 
state boundaries and territorial jurisdiction, and therefore fundamental 
provisions of the state constitution, should require more than a mere legislative 




the legislatures of the states by the constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them 
or modified by their state constitutions any more than can their power to elect senators of the United 
States.” Id. at 35. It compared the Constitution’s designation of the legislature alone as the state’s 
agent for directing the manner of appointing presidential electors to the Constitution’s designation of 
the state’s delegation in the House of Representatives as its sole agent for voting in presidential run-
off elections in the House. Id. at 26-27. 
  
In the early days of the republic, Massachusetts adopted and changed the mode of choosing electors 
by simple resolution, without the signature of the governor, rather than by legislation. E.g., MASS 
RESOLVES, c. 6 (1800). 
 45 Arizona State Legis., 135 S. Ct. at 2668 n.17.  In Article IV, the Constitution outlines creation of new 
states:  
  New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be 
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by 
the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.   
  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 
 46 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States . . . shall protect each of them . . . on Application 
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic 
Violence.”).  
 47 The Court has characterized the consent necessary for federal acquisitions under the Enclave Clause 
as the consent of the state.  See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541–42 (1976) (referring 
in several places to state rather than merely legislative consent); Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 
264–65 (1963) (discussing whether the enclaves at issue were purchased by the consent of the 
California Legislature and highlighting the power of the Federal government to acquire land within a 
state without the consent of the state); Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 530–33 (1885) 
(referring to consent of the state).  However, the issue was not under adjudication in these cases; 
perhaps the Court used “consent of the state” language merely as shorthand for consent of the state 
legislature. 
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as does historical practice,
48
 and James Madison’s commentary in Number 43 
of The Federalist.49 
However, the text of the Guarantee Clause—vesting the power in the 
legislature or if the legislature cannot be convened, in the governor alone—
suggests that the consent of each branch is given independently. 
G. Judicial Functions 
In several places, the Constitution conveys power through words of 
obligation or entitlement rather than explicit words of grant.
50
  The provisions 
requiring trial juries and grand juries
51
 are illustrative: They effectively 
empower federal officials to empanel juries and the juries to carry out their 
respective roles.  These juries exercise federal judicial functions. 
 
 48 See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 39 (1871) (discussing Virginia’s consent to the creation 
of West Virginia by an act of ordinary legislation); United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 819 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (finding consent by Minnesota to a federal enclave from the totality of that state’s conduct). 
49
  In referring to the capital district and other federal enclaves, James Madison commented:  
 And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it; as the 
State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights and the consent of the citizens 
inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing 
parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the election of the government 
which is to exercise authority over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, 
derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of 
the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, to concur in the 
cession, will be derived from the whole people of the State in their adoption of the 
Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be obviated . . . .  The necessity of a like 
authority over forts, magazines, etc., established by the general government, is not less 
evident . . . .  All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring the 
concurrence of the States concerned, in every such establishment.   
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).  
 50 See Natelson, supra note 4, at 95–96 (discussing grants through words of obligation in Articles IV & 
VI of the Constitution). 
 51 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall 
be by Jury[.]”); id. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury[.]”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury[.]”); 
id. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved[.]”). 
202 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:1 
   
 
II. SOME COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL FUNCTIONS 
An actor exercising a federal function derives his, her, or its authority from 
the portion of the Constitution empowering the actor.  The courts have made 
this clear by rejecting claims that a state legislature’s authority in the 
amendment process is a power reserved by the Tenth Amendment
52
 and 
therefore subject to state law.
53
  Similarly, the power to direct the method for 
choosing presidential electors “is conferred upon the legislatures of the states 
by the constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from them or 
modified by their state constitutions.”
54
  When Congress exercises Article V 
functions, it also acts as an independent assembly—not as the legislature 
empowered by other portions of the Constitution.
55
 
Explicit powers devolving federal functions carry with them incidental 
authority, just as explicit powers elsewhere in the Constitution do.
56
  The scope 
of incidental authority is defined by custom and necessity.
57
 
The courts frequently have adjudicated the question of whether the grant 
of a federal function carries with it a particular incidental power.  The issue 
has surfaced most often in cases involving the amendment process.  For 
example, if Congress selects the convention mode of ratifying a proposed 
 
 52 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also 
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931) (holding the Tenth Amendment is inapplicable 
to Article V); United States v. Thibault, 47 F.2d 169, 172 (2d. Cir. 1931) (holding the Tenth 
Amendment is inapplicable to Article V); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1892) (holding 
that electors receive their power directly from the Constitution). 
 53 Courts have consistently held that the legislature is free to disregard state rules when ratifying an 
amendment.  See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 
230 (1920); Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575, 577–78  (M.D. Fla. 1973); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. 
Supp. 1291, 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Walker v. Dunn, 498 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1972). 
54
  McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35. 
 55 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 56 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 373 (1921) (holding that Congress has power to limit time for 
ratification as incidental to its selection of a mode of ratification because in Article V “what is 
reasonably implied is as much a part of it as what is expressed”); cf. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. 
Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020) (holding each state’s power to determine the method of choosing its 
presidential electors includes the unstated power of dictating how they vote). 
 57 See Robert G. Natelson, Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF 
THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52, 60–66 (2010) (exploring the origin and scope of 
incidental powers); cf. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 8 (“history” and “[L]ongstanding practice”); id. at 8 (“the 
Nation’s history”); id. at 12 (citing practice “for centuries now”); id. at 13 (“Long settled and 
established practice”).  
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amendment, the state legislatures enjoy incidental authority to constitute 
ratifying conventions for their states.
58
  In like manner, a legislature or 
convention serving an Article V function has the well-recognized prerogative 
of adopting its own rules of suffrage and procedure.
59
  Because a convention 
for proposing amendments is a “convention of the states,”
60
 presumably state 
legislatures enjoy the incidental federal functions of deciding how their states’ 
commissioners are selected and instructed—state legislative prerogatives 
universal in the convention of states setting.
61
  Of course, these Article V cases 




However, no person or entity has incidental powers that would defeat or 
impair the constitutional functions of other persons or entities.
63
  For example, 
fixing the time and place of meeting is incidental to Congress’s power to call 
an amendments convention.
64
  However, treating the dictation of rules and 
other procedures to the convention as incidental to the call, as some have 
suggested,
65
 would undercut the convention’s intended role as a way to bypass 
 
 58 State ex rel. Donnelly v. Myers, 186 N.E. 918 (Ohio 1933) (stating that the calling of a convention is 
an incidental duty of the state legislature when Congress chooses that mode of ratification). 
 59 Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1307–08 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
 60 Smith v. The President & Dirs. of the Union Bank of Georgetown, 30 U.S. 518, 528 (1831); see State 
v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 304 (1835) (referring to the 1788 North Carolina convention to ratify 
proposed amendments as a “convention of the states”).   
 61 Natelson, Mystery, supra note 9, at 4; Natelson, Rules, supra note 9, at 693. 
 62 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884) (enlisting “the doctrine universally applied to all 
instruments of writing, that what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed” 
to conclude that congressional powers are implied by the Elections Clause). 
63 See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Padilla, 363 P.3d 628, 634 (Cal. 2016) (holding that a state 
legislature acting under Article V enjoys an incidental power to investigate, but that 
  The investigative power is not unlimited.  While the Legislature’s powers and functions are 
extensive . . . , they must share space with powers reserved to the executive and judicial 
branches.  Although the Legislature’s activities can overlap with the functions of other 
branches to an extent, the Legislature may not use its powers to “defeat or materially 
impair” the exercise of its fellow branches’ constitutional functions, nor “intrude upon a 
core zone” of another branch’s authority.”). 
  Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997) (holding that a congressional measure 
invading the constitutional sovereignty of the states is not a validate exercise of congressional 
incidental power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, because 
such a measure is not “proper”). 
64 Natelson, Conventions, supra note 9, at 629; NATELSON, LAW OF ARTICLE V, supra note 9, at 55–
58. 
65 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 
YALE L.J. 957, 964 (1963) (arguing that  
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  It also would violate the convention’s incidental power to 
determine such matters for itself.
67
 
III. DIFFERENCES AMONG FEDERAL FUNCTIONS 
The principal differences among federal functions are the actors’ varying 
spheres of authority.  Spheres of authority vary because each federal function 
has its own purpose and arises in its own textual and historical context.  Thus, 
for each function the courts deduce the actor’s scope of authority from the 
Constitution’s text, the nature of the function, and the historical background.
68
  
The following summarizes some of the differences: 
A state legislature acting under the Elections Clause may not adopt 
regulations without the governor’s signature (if required by the state 
constitution).
69




In general, it would seem that the exercise of elective functions would be 
meaningless unless electors may exercise free choice among available 
candidates.  This is obvious in the case of voting for members of Congress, 
and prior to adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, state legislators were 
 
  “[s]ince Congress is to call the convention, and since no specifications are given, and since 
no convention can be called without specifications of constituency, mode of election, 
mandate, majority necessary to ‘propose,’ and so on, then Congress obviously may and 
must specify on these and other necessary matters as its wisdom guides it.”). 
66 Natelson, Rules, supra note 9, at 699–700. 
67 Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291,1307–08 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (holding that a convention may establish 
its own voting requirements). 
 68 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108–112 (2000) (limiting the state power to determine the mode 
of choosing electors); see also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229–31 (1952) (defining the scope of the 
state power to determine the mode of choosing presidential electors); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 
369–72 (1932) (holding that the governor’s signature is necessary to regulations under the Elections 
Clause because of their legislative nature and long acquiescence); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 
227–29 (1920) (examining the historical use of the word “legislature” in Article V); United States v. 
Thibault, 47 F.2d 169, 171–72 (2d Cir. 1931) (relying on long acquiescence to the practice of 
proposing and ratifying constitutional amendments). 
 69 See Smiley, 285 U.S. at 372–73 (holding that “there is nothing in article 1, § 4, which precludes a 
state from providing that legislative action in districting the state for congressional elections shall be 
subject to the veto power of the Governor”).  
 70 Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 366 N.E.2d 1226, 1229 (Mass. 1977); accord Hollingsworth v. 
Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 379 (1798) (explaining that when Congress proposes an amendment the 
president’s signature is not necessary). 
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free to choose the Senators they wished.
71
  Recently, however, the Supreme 
Court reached a “non-obvious” conclusion by upholding state laws dictating 
the votes of presidential electors; the decision, the Court said, was compelled 
by long-standing election practice.
72
  In doing so, the Court almost entirely 
disregarded very substantial evidence that the understanding behind the 




In any event, the scope of an elector’s authority is restricted to voting in 
the election.  If, for example, presidential electors tried to propose a 
constitutional amendment to the states for ratification, that action would be 
ultra vires.74 
A convention for proposing amendments creates an interesting contrast to 
the Electoral College.  In one sense, it has a wider scope of authority: It may 
consider any proposal within the legislative applications of the states that 
applied for it.  But according to the uniform history of similar “conventions of 
the states,” commissioners are unquestionably subject to state legislative 
instruction.
75
  Moreover, a convention for proposing amendments has only 
proposal power; other actions would be ultra vires.76 
A state legislature considering whether to apply for a convention to 
propose amendments has unfettered discretion on whether to apply and for 
what amendments to apply.  Lawmakers cannot be coerced by voter initiatives 
or otherwise.
77
  State legislatures are similarly free to ratify or refuse to ratify 
 
 71 See e.g., GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS142–47 (Ralph Curtis Ringwalt ed. 
1912) (emphasizing that in the decades before adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, several 
states allowed voters to register their senatorial preference in general elections.  State legislatures 
frequently elected candidates other than the popular vote winner). 
72
  Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020).  
 73 Natelson, Discretion, supra note 12. 
 74 See Fitzgerald v. Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (“The sole function of the presidential electors is 
to cast, certify, and transmit the vote of the state for president and vice-president of the nation.”). 
 75 See Natelson, Conventions, supra note 9, at 631 (explaining that commissioners, like other agents, 
were expected to remain within the limits of their authority); see also NATELSON, LAW OF ARTICLE 
V, supra note 9, at 76 (discussing state legislative instruction of convention commissioners). 
76
  See Natelson, Conventions, supra note 9, at 631 (“A convention for proposing amendments could 
recommend that Congress or the states consider amendments outside the subject-matter assigned to 
the convention, but those recommendations would be legally void-that is, they would not be ratifiable 
‘proposals.’”). 
 77 See Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 1999) (striking down a Nebraska constitutional 
provision as “an unconstitutional attempt effectively to remove Article V power from legislators and 
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  State legislatures may sponsor advisory 
referenda,
79
 but are, of course, limited to ratifying amendments that are duly 
proposed. 
The scope of authority of delegates to a ratifying convention is structured 
differently yet: They are limited to the purposes of their call (an up-or-down 
vote on the proposed amendment) but within that limit they are free to 
exercise discretion.
80
  Federal juries are similar in that their authority is sharply 
restricted and consists mostly of exercising free discretion in casting an up-or-
down vote.  Congressional electors are restricted to voting for candidates for 
Congress, although they have free discretion within that narrow scope. 
State legislatures apparently may rescind ratification of a proposed 
amendment before three fourths of the states have ratified
81
 and are free to 




The courts have enlisted both history and constitutional text to determine 
that a state legislature may not yield to a popular referendum the legislative 
 
to place it in the hands of the people”); Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 127 (Ark. 1996) (“[T]the 
framers of the Constitution chose to give voters no direct role in the amending process; legislatures 
alone received the power to . . . ratify amendments.”) (emphasis omitted); Bramberg v. Jones, 978 
P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1999) (holding that voters of a state may not mandate the operation of the 
federal Constitutional process); Am. Fed’n of Labor-Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 613–
14 (Cal. 1984) (emphasizing that the electorate has no power to compel legislative action); Op. of the 
Justices, 673 A.2d 693, 698 (Me. 1996) (noting that the state Legislature may not interfere with the 
exercise of delegated authority with respect to specific voter initiatives); State ex rel. Harper v. 
Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826, 831 (Mont. 1984) (“The people through initiative cannot affect the 
deliberative process.”); In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186, 193 (Okla. 1996) (arguing that 
“[t]he initiative measure does not propose a law”); League of Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F. 
Supp. 52, 62 (D. Me. 1997) (explaining that state ballot labeling laws were an attempt to coerce state 
legislators to vote for the people’s choice).  
 78 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); see Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920) (holding 
that state legislators do not have authority to require ratification of constitutional amendments); 
Decher v. Vaughan, 177 N.W. 388, 391–92 (Mich. 1920) (emphasizing that the action of state 
legislators in ratifying amendments is not required). 
 79 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Padilla, 363 P.3d 628, 646 (Cal. 2016). 
 80 In re Op. of the Justices, 167 A. 176, 180 (Me. 1933) (“The convention must be free to exercise the 
essential and characteristic function of rational deliberation.”). 
 81 Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1150 (D. Idaho 1981), vacated as moot, Carmen v. Idaho, 
459 U.S. 809 (1982). 
 82 See Padilla, 363 P.3d at 650 (“[W]hat the Legislature has enacted, it may repeal” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)).  
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power to establish a ratifying convention.
83
  The Supreme Court of Maine 
enlisted the same sources to determine that a state legislature authorizing a 




When a state exercises its legislative function under the Elections Clause, 
its scope of authority is constrained by the fact that Congress may override 
state regulations.
85




Finally, a governor’s administrative function in issuing writs of election to 
fill congressional vacancies is also limited.  In the usual case, issuing such a 
writ is mandatory, and refusing to do so is outside the governor’s scope of 
authority.
87
  In marked contrast to the functions delegated to state entities by 
Article V, a governor’s appointive function of filling Senate vacancies is 




The prominence in the Constitution of the list of congressional powers in 
Article I, Section 8 sometimes overshadows the fact that the document 
enumerates powers in various other places, including grants of authority to 
actors not part of the federal government at all.  The courts characterize the 
execution of these powers as “federal functions.” 
 
 83 In re Op. of the Justs., 107 A. 673, 675 (Me. 1919); see In re Op. of the Justs., 172 S.E. 474, 478 
(N.C. 1933) (discussing the scope of a legislature’s authority to constitute a ratifying convention); State 
ex rel. Donnelly v. Myers, 186 N.E. 918 (Ohio 1933) (holding that calling a convention to ratify 
proposed amendments is a federal function, in which the absence of Congress, the state legislature 
has the authority to perform). 
 84 In re Op. of the Justs., 107 A. at 674. 
 85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 86 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 808–11 (1995) (holding that state legislatures 
acting under the Elections Clause could not add qualifications for members of Congress beyond 
those listed in the Constitution). 
 87 Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 2010); see Am. C.L. Union of Ohio, Inc. v. Taft, 385 
F.3d 641, 649 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding issuing a writ to fill a vacancy in the House is mandatory); 
Jackson v. Ogilvie, 426 F.2d 1333, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that the defendant had a duty, 
at the time of death of the Representative, to issue a writ to fill his vacancy).   
 88 Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see Tedards v. Ducey, 398 F. Supp. 
3d 529, 535 (D. Ariz. 2019) (explaining that the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution gives “state 
legislatures the authority to establish procedures for filling vacancies in Senate”).   
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Federal functions exercised by non-federal actors fall into eight classes: 
electoral, appointive, proposing, ratifying, administrative, legislative, 
consenting, and judicial.  They all share two characteristics.  One is that the 
authority for executing them comes directly from the Constitution, and not 
from state constitutions or state or federal law—although in some cases the 
relevant constitutional provision explicitly authorizes regulation by state law.  
Another common characteristic is that the grants creating the functions, like 
other power grants in the Constitution, include limited incidental, implied 
authority. 
Otherwise, these functions differ substantially.  One illustration is the 
scope of discretion exercised by each designated actor.  For example, although 
state legislatures may control the discretion of both presidential electors and 
amendments convention commissioners, presidential electors are limited to a 
very narrow agenda, while state applications for a convention for proposing 
amendments generally offer that convention a broader scope.  Similarly, a state 
legislature determining how presidential electors or amendments convention 
commissioners are chosen has wide discretion, but a state legislature 
determining whether to ratify a proposed amendment—like a federal jury 
determining guilt or innocence—may cast only an up-or-down vote.  In each 
case, the scope of authority is determined by the language the Constitution 
employs, the nature of the function, and the history behind it. 
 
